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UNION POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND REFORM
OF CAMPAIGN FINANCING REGULATION
George P. Macdonald*
I. Introduction
Congress has long evidenced a concern to prevent candidates in
federal elections from becoming dependent solely on large campaign
contributors, such as corporations or labor unions.' The most recent
congressional response to the problem of union and corporate contribu-
tions was enacted as section 304 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 19472 and is now codified as section 610 of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act.3 Section 610 prohibits both direct contributions and ex-
*Mr. Macdonald is a member of the staff of Prospectus.
'The first concrete manifestation of this concern was a 1907 federal statute which
prohibited any corporation or national bank from rendering "a money contribution in
connection with any election to any political office." Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat.
864. This statute further prohibited any corporation from making a like contribution
"in connection with any election at which presidential and vice-presidential electors
or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any state
legislature of a United States Senator." The Act of 1907 was the genesis of present
§610 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. I11, 43 Stat. 1070
(codified in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C.).
The Supreme Court decision in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921),
invalidating federal regulation of Senate primary elections, was followed by the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. Section 313 of this statute strengthened the
Act of 1907 by altering the phrase "money contribution" to "contribution" and by
penalizing the recipient as well as the contributor.
In 1943, Congress ,assed the Smith-Connally Act, 57 Stat. 163, which for the first
time extended §313 to labor unions. This wartime legislation prohibited only contri-
butions given directly to the federal candidates and failed to encompass expenditures
made for the purpose of aiding such candidates though not directly handed over to
them.
261 Stat. 159-160 (1947).
a 18 U.S.C. §610 which reads as follows:
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation
organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a
contribution or expenditure in connection with any elec-
tion to any political office, or in connection with any
primary election or political convention or caucus held to
select candidates for any political office, or for any cor-
poration whatever, or any labor organization to make a
contribution or expenditure in connection with any elec-
tion at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors
or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for,
or in connection with any primary election or political
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of
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penditures by labor unions or corporations "in connection with" any
federal election, nominating convention, primary or party caucus. 4
The spiralling costs of political campaigns 5 and the continuing signifi-
cant role played by unions and corporations in the financing of those
campaigns call for an examination of section 610's efficacy as a prohibi-
tory statute. This article will focus on the use of labor union funds in the
financial aspects of national politics. It will first discuss the loopholes in
section 610: those loopholes created through narrow judicial inter-
pretation of the statute and those resulting from its imprecise drafting.
Particular emphasis will be placed upon an analysis of the sources of
funds available to unions for political activities and the political uses for
which those funds may be expended. Attention will also be given to the
practical and constitutional difficulties inherent in section 610's attempt
to circumscribe labor's participation in national politics. Various propos-
the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political com-
mittee, or other person to accept or receive any contribu-
tion prohibited by this section.
Every corporation or labor organization which makes
any contribution or expenditure in violation of this sec-
tion shall be fined not more than $5,000; and every
officer or director of any corporation, or officer of any
labor organization, who consents to any contribution or
expenditure by the corporation or labor organization, as
the case may be, and any person who accepts or receives
any contribution, in violation of this section, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
1 year or both; and if the violation was willful shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
two years or both.
For the purposes of this section "labor organizations"
means any organization of any kind or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose,
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.
Section 610 is a recodification of §313 of the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
Section 313 was the provision amended by §304 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.
4 In addition, §610 prohibits any national bank or corporation organized by authority of
any law of Congress to make any contribution or expenditure whatsoever in con-
nection with any election, federal or state.
5 The President's Commission on Campaign Costs found that the Democratic and Republi-
can Parties reported total expenditures in national campaigns of $11.6 million in
1952, $12.9 million in 1956 and almost $20 million in 1960. The Congressional
Quarterly cited the figure in 1964 as approximately $42 million. The Commission
estimated that expenditures on behalf of all candidates for all public offices in the
United States probably reached $165 to $175 million in 1960 while Herbert Alexan-
der, director of the Citizen's Research Foundation, estimated similar expenditures at
$250 million in 1968. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, FINANCING
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, 9 (1962); THE CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY
REPORT, Dec. 13, 1968, at 3282, and Quarter Billion Dollar Campaign, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Nov. 11, 1968 at 52.
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als for rectifying section 610's inadequacies will be presented and their
viability will be evaluated. Finally the author will propose and attempt to
justify what he deems to be a more realistic approach to the union's
proper role in campaign financing.
II. Loopholes in Section 610
A. Voluntary Funds Loophole
Section 610 proscribes political contributions and expenditures only
out of assessed union dues, that is, the general fund of the union.
Congress did not intend to prohibit unions from soliciting "voluntary"
contributions from their members or others. Its intent was reflected in
the words of Senator Robert Taft, co-sponsor of the Labor Management
Relations Act, spoken during the Senate's debate on the provision:
Labor unions are supposed to keep out of
politics in the same way that corporations are
supposed to keep out of politics... the prohi-
bition is against labor unions using their
members dues for political purposes
.... [Emphasis added]6.
Although the literal wording of the statute proscribes all contributions
and expenditures, whether they involve voluntary funds or union dues,
courts have paid heed to this congressional intention. A union, upon
obtaining voluntary contributions, may directly hand these monies over
to federal candidates and national political committees or may spend
them itself in any partisan or nonpartisan political activity without vio-
lating the statute.7
The obstacles encounted by unions with respect to the contribution of
voluntary funds therefore do not arise from legal restrictions, but rather
from their difficulties in motivating union members to contribute money
6 Labor-Management Relations Conference Report, 93 CONG. REC. 6440 (1947).
7 The importance of this loophole to labor unions is demonstrated by the fact that
$442,000 of union expenditures in 1964 were financed out of voluntary funds. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1968, §1 at 10, col. 5.
A contemporary example of the importance of this loophole to candidates was the
case of John J. Gilligan, Democratic candidate for U.S. Senator from Ohio in the
1968 election. Mr. Gilligan was slated to receive $250,000 in union voluntary funds
contributions for his campaign efforts or nearly one third of his budgeted expenses.
He incurred the wrath of The Committee on Political Education, the political arm of
the AFL-CIO, for his hesitancy to support Hubert H. Humphrey and for his support
of the Viet Nam peace plank at the Democratic Convention. As a result, the funds
alloted to him were largely cut off. Although labor leaders denied that they intended
to "starve" Mr. Gilligan's campaign, it was only after he announced his support of
Mr. Humphrey that the funds began to flow back into his campaign, albeit at a
significantly lower rate. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, §I at 26, col. 4.
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over and above their regular dues and in actively soliciting such funds
without coercing or alienating the union rank and file. 8 Joseph L. Rauth,
Jr., counsel for the United Automobile Workers, has described rank and
file beliefs:
Union members generally believe that they
have already contributed for all union activi-
ties by the payment of their union dues, in-
tended not only for collective bargaining but
also for legislation, political and other com-
munity activity. Union members do not ex-
pect that they will have to pay twice to pro-
tect their interests and are not anxious to
contribute a second time.9
In spite of this understandable attitude, unions have been moderately
successful in soliciting voluntary contributions. 1
Unions, in addition, possess two devices for circumventing section
610's prohibitions by greatly enlarging the category of funds viewed as
"voluntary". The first device is the authorization card plan; a union
member simply signs a card designating part of his dues as voluntarily
given, thereby permitting a union to spend that amount in political
activities as it sees fit. Since that portion of the dues is then construed as
a voluntary contribution, it may be directly contributed to federal candi-
dates and its use is not subject to any of section 610's prohibitions. The
authorization card plan works well because regardless of whether the
union member authorizes such use of his dues, that portion of his dues
will not be refunded to him. Accordingly, he will see little value in
refusing such authorization and thereby possibly incurring the dis-
pleasure of his union superiors or peers. In 1960 this device was ex-
pressly upheld by a federal district court in United States v. Warehouse
& Distributions Workers Local 688.11 The court viewed the author-
ization plan as not violative of section 610 so long as there was an
accounting of such funds and the amounts expended did not exceed the
voluntary funds so authorized.
The second judicially approved method of expanding the meaning of
"voluntary" is a union-conducted election in which the majority of the
union members assent to use of their dues in partisan political activi-
ties. In United States v. Anchorage Central Labor Council
8 A. HEARD, COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 194-95 (1960).
9 Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 152, 153 (1961).
10 Alexander Heard estimated that one of eight members of the AFL-CIO unions, or
approximately 1,400,000 people, made voluntary donations in 1956. In 1964, labor
unions reported receipts of $730,000 in voluntary funds. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1968,
§I at 10, col. 5. Indeed, even in a non-election year such as 1967 COPE filed a report
showing voluntary contributions of $378,000. HEARD, supra note 8, at 190-94 and
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, March 8, 1968, at 488.




(AFL-CIO),'2 an organization composed of twenty-six unions was in-
dicted under section 610 for having expended funds from the organiza-
tion's treasury to sponsor a series of commercial television broadcasts
which included expressions of political advocacy aimed at the general
public during a federal election. The funds used to finance the telecasts
comprised union dues of the various member unions. The organization's
activity appeared to constitute a clear violation of the expenditure prohi-
bition and was certainly contrary to the intent of Senator Taft, who
viewed section 610 as a vehicle to cut off use of union dues in partisan
politics. Nevertheless, the district judge evaluated the permissibility of
the expenditure in terms of whether the funds were "voluntary" in
nature:
No union was called upon to pay for this
program. Each union decided by a vote of its
membership.., first, whether they would
contribute and second, how much. Surely,
that is voluntary; and that, I think, is the crux
of the situation here.' 3
This decision seems to hold that when a majority of union members
votes to use union dues to finance partisan political activities, the use of
those funds will not violate section 610 because voluntary approval by
majority vote transforms these monies into "voluntary" funds. The
actual expenditure in Anchorage Labor Council involved two steps:
first, the funds were approved by a majority vote of the rank and file and
second, the funds were transferred from the union to the dispersing
organization. One might attempt to legitimate the court's decision by
arguing that the transfer of monies to a nonunion entity, the organiza-
tion, distinguishes this fact situation from one involving a direct dis-
persal of these funds by the union itself. However, the legal issue
concerning section 610 is whether the dues can be construed as volun-
tary contributions, and the resolution of this issue centers upon whether
a majority vote alters the character of dues so as to make them ex-
pendable as voluntary contributions. Thus, the transfer of funds seems
extraneous to the real legal issue and provides no basis for justifying
Anchorage Labor Council.Yet there are no more recent decisions which
would invalidate the use of such a device to circumvent the prohibitions
of section 610.
B. State Election Loophole
The literal wording of section 610 proscribes the use of union dues
in "any election at which" federal officials are elected.1 4 Therefore, a
12 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alas. 1961).
13 Id. at 506.
14 It has been argued that §610's prohibitions are broad enough to restrict contributions to
state officials. This argument is premised on a construction of the phrase, "in any
April 1969]
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union may directly contribute both dues and voluntary funds to candi-
dates for state elective offices without incurring any legal sanction. 15
Such direct contributions to state candidates and political committees
have three effects. First, substantial direct union contributions to-such
candidates may result in the election of these assumedly pro-labor
people, thereby placing them in positions to implement pro-labor policies
in the states. Second, such contributions unburden the national party
from financing the state candidates or committees to the extent of those
contributions, thereby allowing the party to funnel more money into the
campaigns of pro-labor federal candidates. Third, union contributions to
state candidates or committees have an uncanny way of ultimately
financing federal candidates. 16 This is accomplished by a rather cir-
cuitous route. The unions contribute substantial sums to political com-
mittees operating within only one state and thereby escape the limita-
tions that section 608 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act imposes
upon contributions to those operating in more than one state (interstate
committees). 17 Such monies become commingled in state political funds
and are then often transferred by the state committees to the treasuries
of the interstate political committees, to whom the unions are forbidden
election at which" voting for federal officers occurs, to include state elections which
occur coincident with a federal election.
This argument was raised but summarily dismissed by the California Supreme
Court in DeMille v. Federation of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947)
cert. denied 333 U.S. 876 (1948), as beyond the legislative intent of Congress.
The inapplicability of §610's prohibitions to state elections seems to have been
recognized tacitly by the government in as much as it appears that there have been no
subsequent indictments concerning this issue. It is common practice for unions to
expend large amounts of dues money in state elections. See A. HEARD, supra note 8,
at 169-211.
15 Labor unions; are subject to statutory prohibitions against volitical contributions in state
elections in only four states. See Brown, State Regulation of Union Political Action,
6 LAB. L.J. 769 (1955).
16 See A. Heard, supra note 8, at 198-200.
17 Section 608 of title 18 reads in part as follows:
(a) Whoever, directly or indirectly, makes contribu-
tions in an aggregate amount of excess of $5,000 during
any calendar year, or in connection with any campaign
for nomination or election, to or on behalf of any candi-
date for an elective Federal office, including the offices of
President of the United States and Presidential and Vice
Presidential electors, or to or on behalf of any committee
or other organization engaged in furthering, advancing,
or advocating the nomination or election of any candi-
date for any such office or the success of any national
political party, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
This subsection shall not apply to contributions made
to or by a State or local committee or other State or
local organization or to similar committees or organiza-
tions in the District of Columbia or in any Territory or
Possession of the United States. tEmphasis addedl.
A very recent example of such roundabout financing of federal candidates occurred
in 1968 when the International Seafarer's Union contributed $100,000 to the cam-
paign coffers of Lyndon B. Johnson, prior to his decision not to run for reelection,
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to contribute dues money under section 608. These interstate com-
mittees, such as the congressional campaign committees,18 partially
finance federal candidates. In this manner, the prohibition in section 610
is circumvented and a union may, in effect, directly contribute to the
campaigns of pro-labor federal candidates.
C. "Non-Expenditure" Loopholes
Another set of loopholes by which unions can evade section 610's
strict expenditure prohibition stems from its inherent ambiguity. While
the statute proscribes any union "expenditure in connection with"any
federalelection, caucus or nominating convention, the meaning of the
word "expenditure" and the meaning of the phrase "in connection with"
remain unclear. Since judicial attempts to clarify the meaning of such
language have been rare, various political uses for union dues have
become generally regarded as permissible.
1. Nonpartisan Expenditures
Although section 610 prohibits all expenditures of union dues in
connection with federal elections, it is generally conceded that unions
may expend general funds to finance nonpartisan political activities such
as registration drives'9 or "get-out-the vote" drives. Such nonpartisan
activities might encompass the assignment of union employees as drivers
to transport voters to the polls on election day or as distributors of
political pamphlets. The value to the unions of such "nonpartisan"
activities becomes apparent when one realizes that full registration and
full voting by union members and their families will usually result in
more votes for pro-labor candidates. Furthermore, nonunion people who
vote only as a result of such drives tend to be in the lower urban
socioeconomic levels and tend to vote Democratic, therefore usually
pro-labor.2 0
and to those of Hubert H. Humphrey. Of the $50,000 donated to ten Johnson
committees, $40,000 did not have to be reported under federal law because eight
were state political committees. For other aspects of a rather interesting chain of
events see Wall St. J., July 19, 1968, p. 1, col. 6.
18 A. HEARD, supra note 8, at 194-95.
19 The Justice Department agreed that "general funds can legitimately be used under
Section 610... for the purpose of carrying on registration drives." This admission
was contained in the brief for the United States at 50, United States v. UAW, 352
U.S. 567 (1957).
The UAW, for example, has a Citizenship Fund, financed by union dues, which
exists to carry on registration and voting drives aimed at all citizens as well as
carrying on "organizational and educational programs." During the years 1952-58 the
size of this fund averaged $775,000 a year while expenditures averaged $790,000. A.
HEARD. supra note 8, at 199-201.20 The political importance of these programs is so great that the AFL-CIO made plans to
assess $700,000 for their execution in 1968. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY
REP. March 8, 1968, at 488.
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What other nonpartisan activities may be legally funded by union dues
is unclear. Short of direct contributions to federal candidates or blatant
advocacy of one candidate over another in the commercial media paid
for by general funds, the unions are really left to make their own
determinations as to what is "nonpartisan" and are then at the mercy of
judicial interpretation of these activities.
2. Educational Expenditures
General funds may also be expended by the unions for "educational"
purposes. Section 610 has been construed as prohibiting only "political"
use of those funds in federal elections. The above mentioned registration
and vote drives are deemed "educational" in purpose as are all union
nonpartisan political activities. Union general funds may also be ex-
pended to finance research and general publication of findings on public
issues, public question campaigns, and referendums which do not per se
involve the political parties or federal candidates but which may involve
the union's self-interests. 2 1 In actuality the distinction between an
"educational" or "nonpartisan" expenditure and a "political" ex-
penditure may be a rather fine one. Union general funds in the end are
expended for political purposes which are only nominally educational
such as union-sponsored training classes and institutes which tend, of
course, to convince their pupils to vote pro-labor and to participate in
the campaigns of pro-labor candidates.
3. Printing of Voting Records
Legislative history indicates that section 610 permits the use of union
general funds to publish the voting records of federal candidates and to
distribute the records among the public at large as a part of the union's
"educational" programs. 2 2 This loophole is subject to the limitation that
21 Each side of a particular public issue campaign or referendum may be identifiable with
either the Democratic or Republican philosophy, or either party's respective candi-
dates. Union funds may still be expended in these areas, being deemed "educational",
thereby forming or consolidating pro-labor attitudes among the voting populace which
may spillover into a federal election. Union public relation campaigns financed by
general funds may likewise produce a pro-labor viewpoint among members of the
general populace which will have a similar spillover effect.
22During debate on §304 of the Labor Management Relations Act (now §610 of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act), Senator Ball stated, "I do not think there is a single
thing in the bill which prohibits any union ... from printing any public official's voting
record. That is not a campaign for or against a candidate. It is simply the printing of
public information." Senator Taft ultimately agreed with Senator Ball:
If it was merely a bare statement of actual facts and
simply direct quotations of what the man had said ... and
was not colored in any way, I would rather
agree .... But ... it would depend in each case, on the
character of the publication. 93 CONG. REC. 6447 (1947).
[Vol. 2:2
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such publications must present no more than a bare statement of the
voting records without any comment prejudicing one candidate or anoth-
er.
23
4. Salaries and Services
It is unclear whether section 6 10 allows a union to loan union person-
nel to federal candidates so that they might work for the candidates
while the union continues to pay their wages or salaries. Section 591 of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act defines a "contribution" or "ex-
penditure" under section 610 as including a "loan... of money, or
anything of value", and it is arguable that free campaign workers are
something of value. However, the only reported case held that such a
loan did not violate section 610, the judge opining that its proscription
was not within the intent of Congress. 2
4
A 1962 Justice Department memorandum, in reply to legal advice
being circulated by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, expressed the view
that salaries and wages paid by a corporation to regular employees who
work in the campaign of a federal candidate would be prohibited under
the expenditure provision in section 610.25 Quite possibly, the Justice
Department holds the same view toward similar actions by a union.
23 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366
F.2d 710 (1966), set forth a test for whether a corporate-sponsored advertisement of
a voting record was permissible. The test was whether the advertisement merely
contained an objective listing of the candidates' voting records in contradistinction to
an advertisement going beyond a bald statement of those records by being explicitly
or implicitly slanted in favor of one candidate. This test appears equally suited to
labor unions.
24 United States v. Construction & Gen. Laborers' Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D.
Mo. 1951). The indictment charged that union dues had been used in violation of
§610's expenditure prohibition to pay salaries to three union employees who had
spent union time working in the congressional campaign of the union's president.
These activities included transporting voters to registration and to the polls, passing
out pamphlets and driving a campaign wagon for the benefit of that candidate. The
district judge ruled that some of the activities, such as driving voters to register and to
vote, worked for the general benefit of all candidates, and thus were nonpartisan
activities not violative of §610's "expenditure" prohibition. He viewed other activi-
ties, such as ihe driving of the campaign wagon, as activities exclusively devoted to
the political interests of the union's president and therefore partisan. However, he
still declined to adjudge these violative of §610 reasoning that the amount of union
dues as salaries was too insignificant to warrant criminal prosecution under §610. He
further observed:
It is difficult for me to believe that Congress, with its
vast knowledge of the practical application of its acts,
intended such a restriction as is sought to be placed upon
labor unions as here. 101 F. Supp. at 876.
2 Justice Department Memorandum, Jan. 26, 1962, as reported in Lambert, Corporate
Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1965).
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However, there have been no reported section 610 indictments or con-
victions for such activities since the Justice Department memorandum;
perhaps the Department is as reluctant to prosecute these activities as
the courts are to proscribe them.
If the salaries and wages of the union personnel are paid out of
voluntary contributions garnered by the union, then a loan of these
people to work in partisan political activities seems permissible under
section 610. The question, however, is more difficult when unions loan
personnel to aid federal candidates and do not continue to pay their
wages or salaries but rather grant them a leave of absence without
cutting off their seniority or retirement benefits.
5. The Union Communication Exception
The area where the law is least clear, and in some ways where it is
most important that it be clear, is the extent to which section 610
prohibits unions from expending dues money for partisan political pur-
poses in the communication media. The only Supreme Court cases
concerning section 610 have dealt with this problem.
Less than one year after the passage of section 610, the Congress of
Industrial Organizations set out to test the constitutionality of the new
statute. The fact situation involved a public statement by the president
of the CIO in the union-dues-funded CIO News endorsing a Democratic
candidate for federal office. Both the CIO and its president were sub-
sequently indicted and charged with violating the expenditure prohibi-
tion in section 610. The district court dismissed the indictment on the
grounds that section 610 was an unconstitutional abridgement of first
amendment freedoms.26 On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, 27 the
majority of the Court avoided the constitutional issue 28 and simply
observed that if section 610's expenditure prohibition was interpreted to
include conduct such as the indictment charged, the constitutionality of
section 610 would be placed in "gravest doubt." 29 Instead the Court
reached the conclusion that the expenditure prohibition did not apply to
the publication and distribution of partisan political advocacies in a
regular union periodical financed from general funds and distributed to
"those accustomed to receive copies." Uncertainty as to whether the
Court meant the phrase "those accustomed to receive copies" to include
26 United States v. CIO, 77 F. Supp. 355, (D.D.C. 1948).
27 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
28 Federal courts, as a general rule, will attempt to avoid deciding constitutional issues if
other grounds can be discovered for the decision. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
346-48 (1936) (concurring opinion) contains a set of rules "under which the Supreme
Court has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed
upon it for decision."2 9 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. at 121. The case really involved §313 of the Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925, as amended by §304 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
but that section is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §6 10.
[Vol. 2:2
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only union members or union members plus an undefined segment of the
general public has given rise to further uncertainty as to how much that
decision has narrowed the applicability of the expenditure prohibition.3 0
Quite clearly CIO can be construed to permit any expenditure of union
dues for partisan political remarks when such remarks are aimed solely
at union members and are published in a union periodical. 3 '
An interesting facet of the CIO case is that the decision itself, part o1
the first litigation concerning section 610 after its passage one year
before, expressly contravened the intent of the statute's co-sponsor.
During the Senate's discussion of section 610, Senator Taft was asked
whether a labor periodical would be permitted, under the pending bill, to
endorse a candidate. The Senator answered:
If it were supported by union funds con-
tributed by union members as union
dues .... [such endoresement] would be a
violation of the law.3 2
Such judicial insensitivity to Senator Taft's intent pointed up a wary
Supreme Court attitude toward the political or constitutional propriety
of section 610; in fact, all nine Justices of the Court viewed section 610
as unconstitutional or of most doubtful constitutionality.
In 1957 the Supreme Court implicitly affirmed its decision in the CIO
case in United States v. UA W, 33 while also suggesting certain criteria to
be applied by courts in determining whether the expenditure provision
has been violated. As in CIO, the fact situation in UAW concerned the
financing of partisan political messages in the communication media with
union dues. However, the crucial difference between the cases was that
in UAW the union was indicted under section 610 for using dues to
sponsor such messages in the nonunion medium of television, whereas
CIO concerned the legality of financing such messages in union media.
The indictment in UAW charged that the broadcasts "included ex-
pressions of political advocacy, and were intended by defendant to
3 The uncertainty of the breadth of the CIO decision has been heightened because the
Court ignbred the fact that the union printed one thousand extra copies of the
periodical which were most probably distributed among some nonunion people.
This overprinting was noted in the indictment which charged the CIO with sending
the extra copies into a congressional district with the probable intent of distributing
them to nonunion people.
31 The CIO case only upheld the communication of a political message via a union
newspaper. However, no indictment was ever brought against George Meany for a
closed circuit telecast to union members, financed by general funds, in which he urged
union members to vote for candidates of the Democratic Party in the 1956 election.
Rauh, supra note 9, at 158.
32 93 CONG. REC. 6436 (1947).
33 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
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influence the electorate generally" and "to affect the results" of those
elections. 34 The district judge dismissed the indictment as not alleging a
statutory offense in view of United States v. CIO. However, the Su-
preme Court reversed the dismissal, upheld the indictment on the
grounds that Congress had drafted section 610 to prohibit expenditures
such as those involved, and remanded the case to the district court. The
majority of the Court again declined to rule on the statute's con-
stitutionality, although three Justices dissented, considering section 610
unconstitutional "as construed and applied" in that case.m The majority
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, distinguished CIO by con-
struing the union periodical in CIO as having been "neither directed nor
delivered to the public at large." The union had merely distributed "its
house organ to its own people," whereas in UA W the broadcasts were
seemingly aimed at the general public. The standard apparently set forth
by the Court for determining whether the expenditure of union dues
violated section 610 was: were the dues spent to finance electioneering
aimed at the general public or electioneering aimed at "those affiliated"
with the union? The former was proscribed under section 610, while the
latter was deemed permissible.3 6 Furthermore, in remanding the case,
the Supreme Court proposed four questions, which are as close to
judicial guidelines for section 610 union political activity as have yet
been proposed:
... [1] was the broadcast paid for out of the
general dues of the union membership or may
the funds be fairly said to have been obtained
on a voluntary basis? [2] Did the broadcast
reach the public at large or only those
affiliated with appellee? [3] Did it constitute
active electioneering or simply state the
record of particular candidates on economic
issues? [4] Did the union sponsor the broad-
cast with the intent to affect the results of the
election? [Numbers and emphasis added].3 7
34 Rauh, supra note 9, at 159.
-1 Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Black, dissentec
arguing that §6 10, "as construed and applied, is a broadside assault on the freedom c
political expression guaranteed by the first amendment." 352 U.S. at 598. Thesi
Justices viewed a denial to a union of the opportunity of financing partisan politica
messages over the commercial media with union dues as an unconstitutional abridge
ment of a union's first amendment rights.
36 The test set forth in the UA W decision comes close to overturning the decision of th
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Painters' Local 481, 17
F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949). In that case the court held that §610 was not violated whe
a union placed partisan political advertising in a commercial newspaper and on radic
The court reasoned that since the union did not publish its own newspaper, this wa
the "natural" way for it to communicate with its members.
37 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. at 592.
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The state of the law following UA W is more uncertain than ever. The
"guidelines" proferred by the Supreme Court are phrased so generally
that they are subject to considerable interpretation by all parties con-
cerned. There is little if any predictability to the law in this area save
that unions are assured, from the CIO and UA W cases, that dues can be.
expended to finance a partisan political message if the message reaches
only union members. Beyond this, the courts have failed to delineate
clearly which political activities constitute "active electioneering", what
constitutes "voluntary" funds, who are included among "those
affiliated ' 13  with a union, or finally, what amounts to an "intent to
affect" an election. Such uncertainty fosters evasions of the statute, for
it suggests that the literal and complete prohibition of section 610 will
not be strictly enforced.
D. Summary of Section 610's Present Status
The expenditure prohibition in section 610, while potentially a statu-
tory mechanism for pervasive restriction of union and corporate finan-
cial political activity, never has -served this function due to narrow
judicial construction of its applicability. The literal language of section
610 and its legislative history combine to forbid the use of dues to
publicize a union's partisan political advocacies in any medium what-
soever during a federal election. Yet, such a prohibition completely
mutes a union's duty to protect the interests of its members through at
least espousing the election of a pro-labor candidate over that of an
unsympathetic candidate. Judicial hesitancy concerning the con-
stitutional propriety of such a broad-sweeping prohibition has resulted in
a narrow interpretation of the "expenditure" phrase which, in turn, has
created loopholes in the statute. Voluntary contributions from any
source are not subject to section 610 proscriptions. The Anchorage
Labor Council and Warehouse & Distribution Workers cases have so
enlarged the category of what constitutes voluntary funds that the direct
contribution prohibition in section 610 may be rendered totally
ineffectual if the devices utilized in these cases are not adjudged illegal.
Furthermore, union dues may be spent without restriction in state as
opposed to federal elections. The parameters of permissible section 610
activity in the educational and nonpartisan areas are so ill-defined that
unions are left with great leeway. The point at which one could say that
38 Upon remand, in United States v. UAW, Indict. No. 35004, (E.D. Mich.), the district
judge declined to give the literal meaning to the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter between electioneering aimed at the general public and that aimed at
"those affiliated" with the union. Rather, he instructed the jury that "the Supreme
Court has not said that the law means that such political advocacy [telecasts financed
by general funds] cannot reach non-members at all." The defendants were sub-
sequently adjudged not guilty by the jury. Again, an action constituting a violation
under the literal wording of §610 was deemed permissible partially as a result of
narrow judicial construction of that statute.
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educaffonal, -informational, or nonpartisan activities become partisan in
tone is a rather arbitrary one. Every activity possesses some ultimate
partisan political overtones when that activity occurs during an election
year or when that activity is pursued by a special interest group such as
labor unions. Thus courts are hesitant to prohibit such activities. The
tension in this area becomes particularly acute when, as in the CIO and
UA W cases, the problems of free speech and intra-union communication
are interjected. It is in such a context that courts must make decisions
concerning section 610.
III. Need for a New Approach
Section 610 has been of little, if any, value in policing the financial
political activities of unions. It has led to prosecutions in only a small
number of cases and those prosecutions have been unsuccessful; no
conviction of a union official for violating section 610's prohibitions has
ever been upheld.3 9 If regulation of the amount of union political ex-
penditures is still considered a desirable goal, then unquestionably some
reform is necessary.
A. The Interests Involved
The dilemma which Congress would face if it evaluated section 610 is
complex. The solution involves a consideration and balancing of com-
peting interests: (1) the need to prevent political candidates from becom-
ing inordinately answerable to the interests of large contributors rather
than their constituencies; (2) the very real contemporary need for union
financial participation in the political process; and (3) the right and need
of unions to express their political beliefs in various manners. Before
any balancing can take place, it is necessary to consider these three
factors in more detail.
39 Those unions and union officials convicted by lower courts have had their convictions
reversed by appellate courts. Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign
Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1041 (1965).
Year Complaints Complaints Cases Indictments Cases
Reviewed Investigated Presented Obtained Brought
(by Justice Dept.) to the to Trial
Grand Jury
1956 15 14 .3 1 1
1957 5 4 0 0 0
1958 23 19 1 0 0
1959 17 12 3 3 3
1960 38 16 1 0 0
1961 23 12 0 0 0
121 77 8 4 4
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Two related considerations weigh against allowing the large contrib-
utor a free hand. The first is the fear of undue influence on or control of
the political process which money might buy. The second is the cyni-
cism which arises from the existence of large contributors. This latter
consideration was described in the 1962 Report of the President's Com-
mission on Campaign Costs:
Under present practices, the [political] par-
ties encounter enormous difficulty in raising
adequate funds at the proper time. Given the
erratic flow of funds and the periodic crises in
campaign finance, individuals and organiza-
tions providing substantial gifts at critical mo-
ments can threaten to place a candidate in
moral hock. In consequence, a disturbing and
fundamental failure of present practices is the
widespread cycnicism about the democratic
system they produce. 40 -
On the other hand, rigorous enforcement of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, including section 610, would cut off needed large contri-
butions and significantly debilitate the national parties as effective politi-
cal vehicles, thereby perhaps causing a further splintering of their al-
ready loosely-knit organizations. Such a splintering would make it more
difficult for the parties to perform their task of ameliorating the polarities
between the competing interests in American society. Rigorous en-
forcement without an alternative method for funding the parties would
probably have more dire consequences upon the Democratic Party.
Labor money is actually crucial to the Democratic party in the North
and West if it is to compete with the Republican party. In 1952 and
1956, one-seventh of the direct expenses of national-level
pro-Democratic committees were met with labor money.4 1 The com-
bined reported campaign spending of Democratic and labor committees
in election years often falls short of the expenditures of Republican
committees alone. 42 Preliminary campaign spending reports have re-
vealed that Republican committees spent three times the amount spent
by Democratic committees for the first ten months of the 1968 federal
40 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, supra note 5, at 1I.
41 A. HEARD, supra note 8, at 188.
42 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, Special Report 1966 Political Cam-
paign Contributions and Expenditures Aug. 11, 1967 at 1384 and CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, Special Report, 1964 Political Campaign Contribu-
tions and Expenditures Jan. 21, 1966 at 56.
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campaign. 43 Undoubtedly the realization that special interest contribu-
tions are necessary for an efficacious functioning of a competitive
two-party system is one reason why the courts and the government have
been most reluctant to enforce section 610 stringently.
Over and above any need the political parties might have for union
political involvement, the unions themselves have a definite need and
right to participate in some political activism. Professor Lloyd Reynolds
of Yale University has described the need:




















































































It is often debated whether unions should
'go into politics'; really, they have no choice
in the matter. They are automatically in poli-
tics because they exist under a legal and po-
litical system which has been generally criti-
cal of union activities. The conspiracy suit
and the injunction judge have been a problem
for unions from earliest times. A minimum of
political activity is essential in order that
unions may be able to engage in collective
bargaining on even terms. 44
A further element in the political system motivating union activism is
the existence of many conservative, generally anti-union organizations
which are quite active politically and which are not subject to the
prohibitions of section 610.45 These include such well-funded groups as
the John Birch Society, the Medical Political Action Committee of the
American Medical Association, the National Right to Work Committee
of the National Association of Manufacturers and various employer and
professional associations. In order for the unions to counteract the
anti-labor political activities and propaganda of such groups, it is almost
imperative for unions to reply in the same medium and manner.
The federal government has assumed so much power in the area of
labor-management relations through the various labor and industrial
legislation that a union's welfare is inextricably dependent on the elec-
tion to federal office of candidates sympathetic to labor. Certain objec-
tives in which labor has deep-seated interests cannot be achieved
through collective bargaining, such as public education, adequate
low-cost housing, social insurance and full employment conditions.
These must be achieved through legislation. Also, certain union objec-
tives which might be attained through collective bargaining can be
achieved more quickly through legislation, such as minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions.46 Thus unions are literally compelled to
participate in the elective process.
B. Inadequacy of Certain Suggested Reforms
The success of any reform must be measured by its ability to balance
the competing considerations: the first amendment rights of unions, the
4 4 L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS, 80-81 (1959).
1 Harris, The Riddle of the Labor Vote, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, October 1964, at 43. This
article mentions how anti-union groups funneled their resources into Barry Gold-
water's 1964 campaign thus spurring even the generally conservative labor unions
to join forces with the other unions in supporting Lyndon Johnson's campaign. Mr.
Harris mentions that these groups oppose unions in every cause the unions hold dear.
I See Woll, Unions in Politics: A Study In Law and the Workers Needs, 34 S. CAL. L.
REV. 130, 144-151 (1961) for a discussion of reasons why unions must be politically
active. The article is basically an apologia for union political activism.
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need for large contributions, and the countervailing need for regulation.
By reference to this balancing test, the two most often recommended
reforms are found wanting.
One frequent proposal recommends the elimination of the expenditure
prohibition in section 610 and yet the retention and strict enforcement of
the direct contribution prohibition. This action would be accompanied
by a clear statutory or judicial articulation of what constitutes a forbid-
den contribution, strictly-enforced legislation that requires com-
prehensive disclosure of union or corporate political expenditures and
adequate publicity to insure public censure of any violations, and severe
civil or criminal sanctions which are applied frequently enough to induce
voluntary compliance with the statute.
Such a plan recognizes the need for all large special interest groups to
expend funds in elections to protect their often worthy but conflicting
economic interests. Concurrently the plan avoids some of the hypocrisy
coincident with the existing legislation. It also goes far toward erasing
the constitutional difficulties in section 610 by removing some of the
present statutory bans on partisan political activity.
However, this proposal has a fatal weakness which would probably
render it ineffective. If an interest group such as a union or corporation
is permitted to make expenditures during federal elections while being
proscribed from making direct contributions, it might confer with those
candidates sympathetic to its goals and philosophy. These meetings,
which would necessarily have to be covert, would result in a candidate
advising the union or corporation of the most effective ways in which to
expend its funds for his benefit. The result might be that the union or
corporation would expend the funds on the same activities as the candi-
date would have, had the funds been given to him directly. Although this
proposal would eliminate some of the interpretive gyrations courts have
been forced to make in order to legitimize, under section 610, union
expenditures necessary to a functioning of the political system, it would
still perpetuate much of the hypocrisy and resulting cynicism because it
would entail continued partial reliance on an easily evaded statute.
The other urged reform is a variation of the above plan. Articulated by
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., this proposal4 7 calls for the retention of section
610's contribution prohibition and the construction of the expenditure
prohibition so as to permit a union if it acts in its own name to make
expenditures of both voluntary and general funds in partisan political
activities during federal elections. This system protects a union's con-
stitutional right to free speech by allowing it to put its views before the
public through any medium as long as it is made clear that the views
expressed are those of the union. Rauh has also proposed the prohibition
of indirect contributions by unions, arguing, that this would prevent
47 Rauh, supra note 9, at 161-62.
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candidates from becoming politically answerable and financially obli-
gated to a union.
Rauh's proposal has one advantage over the previously outlined plan.
By requiring a union to reveal its involvement in political activities
clearly to the public, the plan might reduce the Candidates' utilization of
union financial assistance and thus minimize the extent to which they
will feel answerable to the union rather than their constituents. Labor
endorsement of a candidate might alienate as many voters as it actually
convinces to support him. To many segments of the voting populace a
labor endorsement will place a candidate in an unfavorable light vis-a-vis
his unendorsed opponent. Thus unions might abstain from political ac-
tivity, especially when such activity might mean a loss of votes for
pro-labor candidates in areas generally hostile to unions.
Strict enforcement of the Rauh proposal might provide a workable
solution. However, there are difficulties inherent in its enforcement and
at least one undesirable effect. Absent an alternative system of financing
the parties and candidates, the Rauh proposal would considerably im-
poverish the Democratic Party and perhaps foreclose the possibility of
many men who are talented but not wealthy from seeking political office.
Strict enforcement necessitates the discovery of adequate devices for
insuring that all partisan political espousals or activities by a union are
clearly labelled as union-sponsored so that the public is aware of the
source of the propaganda. Policing the innumerable union activities,
such as door-to-door political solicitations, to see that they are not
camouflaged as a candidate's efforts would be an impossible task. The
prospects of fine print evasions and collusion between a union and a
candidate for an apportionment of campaign activities are substantial. If
they did exist, they would perpetuate the hypocrisy surrounding section
610 and would. therefore reinforce voter cynicism and retard small
contributions 48 . Nevertheless, with an adequate program, such as a
tax-credit system, implemented to find alternative sources of campaign
funds, Rauh's proposal holds forth much promise since it does seem to
solve the constitutional problem inherent in section 610.
C. A Coordinated and Realistic Solution
On balance, the most straightforward and potentially satisfactory
course of action probably lies in the repeal of section 610, at least as
48 Seventy-two per cent of the expenses of the Republican presidential campaign in 1964
were met out of individual contributions of $500 or less. Alexander & Meyers, The
Switch in Campaign Giving, FORTUNE, Nov. 1965 at 170. However, this does not
undermine the argument that §610 retards small contributions by fostering voter
cynicism. The 1964 pattern of financing was unusual for the Republican Party and is
attributable to the fact that Senator Barry Goldwater was its candidate. The normal
pattern was restored in 1968 when over fifty per cent of the funds came from large




pertains to labor organizations. 49 At a minimum, repeal will erase the
hypocrisy surrounding the statute. It will likewise remove any doubts as
to the constitutionality of section 610 by removing the statutory prohibi-
tion that restricts the free speech rights of a union to express its political
views through any reasonable means. After repeal, unions will be
allowed to make direct contributions or expend monies as they see fit
thereby protecting their first amendment rights. Repeal will also place
unions on an equal footing with those conservative, generally anti-union
organizations mentioned earlier that are not subject to the prohibitions
of the statute. Of course, absent rigorous enforcement of section 610,
the unions are not presently disadvantaged vis-a-vis such associations
due to the existing loopholes; however, if section 610 ever does become
broadly applied and strictly policed, the unions will be placed in a very
disadvantageous position in their attempt to counteract any anti-labor
political activities by such groups.
Large amounts of money are currently funneled into the political
process from unions and corporations because of the gaping holes in the
statute. Upon repeal there will probably be an even greater influx of
such monies since the restraints upon campaign subsidizations will have
been removed. The result of this influx will be an increase in the
possibility and/or incidence of federal candidates becoming unduly
influenced by a union. Accordingly, an absolutely necessary precedent
to the repeal of section 610 is federal legislation to implement programs
which will provide substantial funds to the parties and candidates from
sources other than large groups like unions. Ideas that have been pro-
posed to achieve this objective include tax credits to encourage small
contributions, federal government subsidies to political candidates, a
nationwide poll tax, collection boxes in supermarkets, and restricting
union contributions to private nonpartisan funds which would then be
allocated to the parties. To date, none of these plans for financing
political parties and candidates have been passed by Congress, although
efforts have been made. A detailed discussion of each of these plans lies
beyond the scope of this article. 50 It appears, however, that the most
feasible plan for reducing the impact of contributions from large special
interest groups would likely be a combination of certain of these propos-
als. Coupling a seriously implemented tax-credit program with federal
campaign subsidies51 andlshortening campaign periods so as to reduce
4 Since the problems incident to §610's applicability to corporate political involvement
have not been considered in this article, it would be improper to recommend any
change in the law as it pertains to such corporate involvement.
50 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, supra note 5 and H. ALEXANDER,
REGULATION OF POLITICAL FINANCE (1966) for discussions of various funding pro-
posals.
51 Such a combination was contained within the Honest Election Law of 1967; the Bill
was reported out of the Senate Finance Committee on November 1, 1967 as an
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.lectioneering costs would inevitably result in a significant decrease in
.he proportion of large interest group contributions to total campaign
-xpenditures. Such a system would stimulate small contributions and
allow candidates to rely more upon small contributors to finance their
:ampaigns or at least to turn to the government for an impartial allot-
ment of funds. Such a system would help overcome the general attitude
among voters that, as individuals, their vote, money or participation is
amendment to H.R. 4890 during the 1st Session of the 90th Congress, but has not
been enacted into law. The pertinent provisions, as summarized by the CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY, included:
Title I -Income Tax Credit for Political Contributions
Individuals would be allowed an income tax credit of 50
percent of the value of political contributions up to $50
in any year-in other words, a $25 maximum credit.
(The $25 maximum credit figure would also apply to the
returns of married persons filing joint returns.) The credit
would be applicable to contributions to announced candi-
dates for any local, state or national office, or political
committees organized exclusively to support candidates
for office, or national political parties and their state and
local affiliates. The credit would apply only to contribu-
tions made in 1968 or thereafter.
Title II - Presidential & Senate Campaign Fund Provisions
To be eligible to receive Government funds, a candi-
date would have to agree not to accept any private cam-
paign contributions for a period of 60 days preceding the
election and 30 days afterwards. Candidates who refused
to make this assurance would be ineligible to receive
federal subsidy funds.
Presidential. A candidate of a major party, defined as a
party whose Presidential candidate ieceived 25 per cent
or more of the popular vote in the preceding Presidential
election, would receive a federal payment of 20 cents
multiplied by the number of popular votes cast for all
Presidential candidates in that previous election. In
1964, 70,644,510 votes were cast for President. Each
major party would thus be entitled to a 1968 subsidy of
up to $14,128,902.
A Presidential candidate of a minor party, defined as a
party which received from 5 to 25 per cent of the popular
vote in the preceding election, would receive a federal
payment of 40 cents for each popular vote cast for his
party's Presidential candidate in that previous election.
(No minor parties received 5 per cent or more in 1964.)
If a minor party had not existed in the previous election,
or had received less than 5 per cent of the vote in the
previous election, it would receive-following the cur-
rent election-a federal payment of 40 cents for each
popular vote it receives, providing its over-all total is at
least 5 per cent. (Presumably, a minor party candidate
would be obliged to find a number of supporters willing
to, make conditional loans, to be repaid only if the party
exceeded 5 per cent in the current election.) A minor
party could not, however, receive more money than it
would have received had it qualified as a major party.
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politically impotent. It is reasonable to assume that many people would
exercise the tax-credit opportunity, since most taxpayers would rather
donate their money to an identifiable cause such as a political candidate
rather than see the money disappear into the mass of federal tax funds.
The tax credit and subsidization programs, by augmenting the sources
of funds available to political candidates, would reduce the possibility
that large contributors would gain undue influence in the political pro-
cess. In addition, this objective may be furthered, although to a lesser
Senatorial. A candidate of a major party, defined as a
party which polled 25 per cent or more of the total vote
in one of the two preceding Senate elections in the state,
would be eligible to receive subsidies amounting to:
(a) 50 cents multiplied by the total vote for all candi-
dates.in the base election, not to exceed 200,000;
(b) 35 cents multiplied by the total vote for all candi-
dates in the base election, between 200,000 and
400,000; and
(c) 20 cents multiplied by the total vote for all candi-
dates in the base election, to the extent that such
votes exceed 400,000.
The minimum payment would-be $10-0,000 however.
A candidate of a minor party, defined as a party which
received at least 5 per cent but less than 25 per cent in
one of two previous Senate elections, would be eligible
to receive:
(a) $1 multiplied by the number of votes received by
his party's candidate in the base election, up to
100,000;
(b) 70'cents multiplied by the number of votes re-
ceived by his party's candidate in the base elec-
tion, above 100,000 and up to 200,000; and
(c) 40 cents multiplied by the number of votes re-
ceived by his party's candidate in the base elec-
tion, above 200,000.
This same scale of payments based on a current Sen-
ate election would apply also to a Senate candidate of a
party which did not receive enough votes in the preced-
ing elections to qualify as a minor party, but which does
receive the requisite 5 per cent of the vote in the current
Senate elections. The payments would be made following
the current election and could not exceed payments for
which major party Senate candidates would be eligible.
Under no conditions could a minor party candidate re-
ceive private contributions which, together with the fed-
eral subsidies he has received, would boost his total
receipts above the level allowed him in the above for-
mulas.
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REP. Sept. 22, 1967 at 1855. For a general
discussion of tax incentive programs, see H. ALEXANDER, TAX INCENTIVES FOR
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (1961). For a discussion of various political campaign
financing proposals, see Hearings on Various Proposals for Financing Political
Campaigns. Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., (1967);
Senate Report No. 714, Report on the Honest Election Act of 1967, by the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., (1967).
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extent, by the adoption of the "contracting out" principle. This is a
device, negative in tone, designed to limit somewhat the amount of funds
accessible to labor unions. As the device is applied in Britain5 2, each
union member is allowed the right to file an "exemption notice" with the
union leadership which excuses the member from paying that part of his
dues which would otherwise be spent upon political activities that the
member opposes. 53 Utilization of this device would decrease the dollar
amount available to unions, thereby reducing the proportion of
union-contributed expenditures to total expenditures in political cam-
paigns. Such a reduction would probably lessen the possible impact of
union political expenditures upon political candidates.5 4
52 Trade Union Act of 1913, 2 & 3 Geo. V. C. 30.
53 This device differs from the authorization card plan, discussed in the text at 350 supra,
which is employed by unions to expand the category of "voluntary" funds. Con-
tracting out provides for a diminution of the dissenter's dues for that portion of his
dues allotted to political activities; thus the union is precluded from spending that
portion at all. However, under the authorization card plan, the dues will be expended
regardless of the dissenter's views, the card simply allowing a union to spend the
funds as voluntary contributions instead of being limited to the uses allowable for
dues under §6 10.
54 Adoption ot the contracting out principle would also serve a second purpose: it would
eliminate the first amendment question of whether a labor union may spend dues of a
union member for political causes which the member disfavors.
The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in the cases of IAM v. Street, 367 U.S.
740 (1961) and Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113
(1963). In essence these decisions forbade unions under the Railway Labor Act from
using money exacted under a union shop agreement for political purposes which are
not "germane to collective bargaining" and to which a member gave affirmative notice
that he was opposed. The remedies proposed by the Court were: (1) a refund of the
portion of exacted dues in the same proportion that union political expenditures bore
to total union expenditures and (2) a reduction of future exactions from the member
by the same proportion.
Although these cases arose under the Railway Labor Act, the principle enunciated
would seem to be equally applicable to unions governed by the National Labor
Relations Act. The likelihood of the extension of this principle suggests that repeal of
§610 need not necessarily be accompanied by a federal contracting out statute to
protect the rights of dissenting union members.
Under either judicial opinion or separate federal statute, there are two significant
problems in applying a contracting out formula. First, it is very difficult to distinguish
between those expenditures which are for political activities "germane to collective
bargaining" and those which are not. Second, as a practical matter, union members
may not invoke the contracting out principle. For one thing, a union member who
seeks to exercise his right to contract out may be subjected to a certain amount of
social pressure from his union leaders or peers aimed at dissuading him from that
action. However, the Wallace phenomenon among labor unions in 1968 seems to
demonstrate that if union members feel strongly enough about a particular candidate
or issue, they will opt to support financially and vote for a candidate who will not
receive distributions from the political coffers of the unions themselves. Still use of
contracting out may be infrequent because union members may be ignorant of their
rights under the formula. However, a program designed to educate the rank and file
about the right to contract out would awaken the members to this opportunity and
would motivate many of them to exercise the right.
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IV. Conclusion
This article has urged a new approach to the problem of preventing
labor unions from exercising undue influence in political campaigns.
Rather than restrict the amount that can be contributed by labor unions,
thus running the risk of practical as well as constitutional problems, the
author has suggested the repeal of section 610, coupled with legislation
to encourage contributions from sources other than large special interest
groups, and utilization of the "contracting out" principle. There are
drawbacks to any proposed solution in the area of campaign financing
because such financing is enmeshed in the "art of the impossible",
politics. However, the author feels that the above proposal offers the
greatest opportunity for affording freedom of expression to all parties
concerned, without allowing any one entity to gain a disproportionate
position of influence within the financial aspects of the elective process.
This proposal seems most fully to meet the criterion of balancing a
protection of the constitutional rights of unions with a protection of
political candidates against becoming pawns of such special interest
groups. At the very least it alters the emphasis of campaign finance
regulation from a negative prohibition on contributions to a positive
encouragement and solicitation of broad-scale contributions.
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